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Preface 
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one, entitled “Goal or gold: Overlapping reward processes in soccer players upon 
scoring and winning money”, was published in April 2015 in the journal PLOS 
ONE and is referred to as “study one” (Häusler et al., 2015). The second study, 
entitled “Gain- and loss-related brain activation are associated with information 
search differences in risky gambles: An fMRI and eye-tracking study”, was  
published in September 2016 in the journal eNeuro and is referred to as “study two” 
(Häusler et al., 2016). The third study, entitled “Preferences and beliefs about  
financial risk taking mediate the association between anterior insula activation and 
self-reported real-life stock trading” was published in July 2018 in the journal  
Scientific Reports and is referred to as “study three” (Häusler et al., 2018). 
Additionally, please note that the materials and methods described in chapter two 
only include the ones used in these three studies and not the ones used in the other 
four that I additionally worked on during the time of my doctoral studies (chapters 
8.1.2 and 8.1.3). 
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Summary 
Together with neuroscientific inventions such as functional magnetic resonance  
imaging (fMRI), economic and psychological developments in the study of human 
decision making have led to the formation of neuroeconomics. As part of this  
research, several aspects of reward, loss, and risk processing have been related to 
(sometimes irrational) human decision making. The three studies that form the 
foundation of this doctoral thesis integrated techniques from neuroscience,  
psychology, and economics to answer specific questions about this relationship.  
The first study provides evidence for a common neural currency of reward  
processing and shows that it exists in the context of money and soccer. The second 
study implemented fMRI and eye-tracking in two separate experiments to show that 
reward- and loss-related brain activation is associated with attention distribution 
(e.g. winning amount vs. winning probability) in risky gambles. The third study 
presents the neuroeconomic (i.e. neuroscientific, psychological, and economic)  
associations of real-life stock purchase and extends previous findings of financial 
risk taking from the laboratory to real life. Using the framework of reward, loss, 
and risk processing to answer detailed research questions about human decision 
making, all three studies show the strength of the neuroeconomic approach and add 
valuable information to our understanding of human behavior. 
In the first chapter, the thesis provides background information on the field of  
neuroeconomics and describes the benefits of the neuroeconomic approach. The 
second chapter describes the materials and methods used in the three studies. It is 
followed by chapter three, which summarizes and links the three main publications 
that I worked on during my doctoral studies. Finally, chapter four consists of a con-
clusion, as well as an outlook and possible applications of the research findings. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Zusammen mit neurowissenschaftlichen Erfindungen wie der funktionellen  
Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT) haben ökonomische und psychologische Ent-
wicklungen bei der Untersuchung von menschlichem Verhalten zu der Entstehung 
der Neuroökonomie geführt. Als Teil dieser Untersuchungen wurden Aspekte der 
Belohnungs-, Verlust- und Risikoverarbeitung in Relation zu (teilweise irrationa-
lem) menschlichem Verhalten gesetzt. Die drei Studien, welche Teil dieser Doktor-
arbeit sind, haben Techniken der Neurowissenschaften, Psychologie und Ökonomie 
verwendet, um bestimmte Fragen über diese Zusammenhänge zu beantworten.  
Die erste Studie zeigt, dass eine gemeinsame neuronale Währung bei der Beloh-
nungsverarbeitung im Kontext von Geld und Fußball verwendet wird. In der zwei-
ten Studie wurden in jeweils unterschiedlichen Experimenten Daten mit Hilfe von 
entweder fMRT oder Blickregistrierungstechniken gesammelt, um einen Zusam-
menhang zwischen der Belohnungs- und Verlustverarbeitung und der Aufmerksam-
keitsallokation (e.g. Gewinnbetrag vs. Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit) in risikobehaf-
teten Lotterien festzustellen. Die dritte Studie stellt die neuroökonomischen (i.e. 
neurowissenschaftlichen, psychologischen und ökonomischen) Zusammenhänge 
des Aktienkaufs (im echten Leben) fest und überträgt bisherige laborbasierte Un-
tersuchungen auf das echte Leben. Alle drei Studien verwendeten das Gerüst der 
Belohnungs-, Verlust-, und Risikoverarbeitung, um die Stärke des neuroökonomi-
schen Ansatzes zu veranschaulichen. Dadurch konnten wertvolle Informationen zu 
unserem Verständnis des menschlichen Verhaltens gewonnen werden.  
Das erste Kapitel dieser Doktorarbeit komprimiert unser Hintergrundwissen der 
Neuroökonomie und erläutert die Bedeutung des neuroökonomischen Ansatzes. 
Das zweite Kapitel beschreibt die Techniken, welche in den drei Studien verwendet 
wurden. Im dritten Kapitel werden die drei Veröffentlichungen, an denen ich wäh-
rend meiner Promotion gearbeitet habe, zusammengefasst und verknüpft. Das ab-
schließende vierte Kapitel besteht aus einem Fazit, Ansätzen zu möglichen Folge-
studien sowie denkbaren Anwendungen der Studienergebnisse. 
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1. Introduction 
Humans make thousands of decisions every day. These can range from small deci-
sions (e.g. what to order in a restaurant) to larger, more life-changing ones (e.g. 
what career to pursue after graduating high school). In simple terms, making a de-
cision can be defined as choosing one option over another or several others. Hence-
forth, “decision making” research studies the processes associated with making a 
certain choice and the response to its subsequent outcomes.  
As far as we know, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) was the first researcher to express 
theories on the processes of decision making (Pascal, 1941). What followed were 
approximately 200 years of neoclassical economic research that produced ideas 
ranging from marginal value to expected utility theory. During this time, humans 
were seen as rational agents who constantly aim to maximize their overall utility 
(also referred to as satisfaction or personal happiness). However, the Nobel Prize 
winners Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provided several examples that chal-
lenged the belief that humans are completely rational decision makers (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Their revolutionary findings are seen as one of the cornerstones 
of behavioral economics and sparked off a great wealth of studies investigating dif-
ferent aspects of human decision making. Additionally, it brought the fields of eco-
nomics and psychology closer together. Then, after a decade of mostly behavioral 
research, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was invented and intro-
duced into the study of human decision making (Ogawa et al., 1990; Blamire et al., 
1992; Frahm et al., 1992; Kwong et al., 1992). 
This made it possible for researchers to use an interdisciplinary approach to study 
the underlying brain activation patterns of human decision making. This new re-
search field, now consisting of theories and methods from economics, psychology, 
and neuroscience, was named neuroeconomics. Since 1990, the number of studies 
in the field of neuroeconomics (here defined as studies using the terms “brain” and 
“decision making”) has greatly increased (Figure 1). In the course of this endeavor, 
it has become clear that reward, loss, and risk processing play an essential part in 
human decision making. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the number of publications in the PubMed database from 1990 to 
2017, including the terms “brain” and “decision making” (data obtained via  
www.pubmed.gov, accessed on June 28th, 2018). 
 
The first part of this introduction starts off by providing a brief history of neoclas-
sical economic theories. It continues with a description of prospect theory and 
shows how it led to the establishment of neuroeconomics. This is then followed by 
a summary of findings in reward, loss, and risk processing research, which shows 
why understanding these processes is essential for our comprehension of human 
decision making. The chapter ends with an explanation of why further neuroeco-
nomic research is necessary in order to improve our understanding of human deci-
sion making. 
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1.1 Economic Theories of Human Decision Making 
1.1.1 Neoclassical Economic Theories 
The first theories regarding choice behavior can be traced back to the middle of the 
17th century, when Blaise Pascal suggested that decision makers should choose the 
option with the highest expected value (EV; Pascal, 1941). Since the EV is made 
up of the probability of winning multiplied by the amount to be won, decision mak-
ers are considered risk neutral if they are indifferent between two options with the 
same EV, risk-seeking if they choose a risky option over a sure payment with the 
same or higher EV, and risk averse if they choose a sure payment over a risky pay-
ment with an equal or higher EV. In this context, it is important to define risk and 
distinguish it from the associated concept of uncertainty. While in decisions under 
risk, decision makers know the probability distributions of the possible outcomes 
(e.g. 50/50 in a coin flip), they have no such information in decisions under uncer-
tainty (Knight, 1921). 
Almost two centuries after Pascal, David Ricardo (1772-1823) worked on the de-
termination of prices and suggested a “labor theory of value” (Ricardo, 1817). This 
theory states that a good’s value is determined by the hours of labor put into the 
creation of the product. Even though several flaws were attached to that theory (put 
into modern terms: It is just as hard to barbecue a perfect rump steak from American 
beef as it is from Kobe beef, even though the latter is almost five times as expensive), 
a solution was only suggested during the marginal revolution (middle and late 19th 
century). There, it was emphasized that a second quantity of a product is of higher 
value to an individual than a 10,000th quantity of the same product (Glimcher and 
Fehr, 2014). The economists during that time reasoned that this is the case, because 
the 10,000th quantity does not elicit as much utility (or satisfaction) as the second 
quantity. A commonly used example for such an argument is (e.g. 500ml) bottled 
water, in which, especially when an individual is thirsty, the 10,000th bottle does not 
elicit as much utility as its second counterpart. Then, Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782) 
went one step further and introduced the total wealth of an individual into the EV 
formula (Bernoulli, 1954). This implied that individuals should make choices that 
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maximize the expected utility (EU), and the associated concave logarithmic func-
tion showed that the wealth of an individual was an important factor in decision 
making (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. The logarithmic expected utility function by Daniel Bernoulli, which shows how 
the increments in utility decrease with each additional quantity of a product (here in US $, 
adapted from Glimcher and Fehr, 2014). 
 
In 1906, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) started the ordinal revolution by arguing that 
the exact absolute numbers or values of different options cannot be exactly quanti-
fied and that the preference of choices can thus only be ordered (Aspers, 2001). In 
line with Pareto’s suggestion that choices should be used to study preferences, Paul 
Samuelson (1915-2009) established the revealed preference approach. Using this 
empirical (and for the first time non-normative) approach, he established the Weak 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Importantly, Samuelson and his col-
leagues pointed out that while choices can be used to assume utilities, it is the 
choices that are directly observed, not the utilities (Samuelson, 1938). Hendrik 
Houthakker (1924-2008) subsequently suggested a Generalized Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (GARP), which was seen as an advanced version of the WARP. It states 
that decision makers who constantly follow a similar ordering of preference can be 
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called transitive (Houthakker, 1950). Only then can an ordinal ranking of prefer-
ences for goods be made, and the conclusion drawn that a decision maker is max-
imizing utility. Otherwise, the decision maker is said to be irrational (in an eco-
nomic sense). 
Considered as the final part of neoclassical economics, John von Neumann (1903-
1957) and Oskar Morgenstern (1902-1977) established EU theory (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1953). As part of this theory, they introduced four axioms that 
made it possible to test whether or not an individual is a rational decision maker. 
First, the completeness axiom assumes that the individual has predefined prefer-
ences and can always decide between two options (either A over B or B over A 
(leaving the issue of indifference between the options aside)). Next, the transitivity 
axiom states that a rational individual makes consistent decisions (if A over B and 
B over C, then A over C). Third, the continuity axiom assumes that there must be a 
lottery between two of the products that has the same subjective value as the third 
product. Finally, the independency axiom states that when the same factor is added 
to two gambles, then a rational decision maker will maintain the same preference 
order as when the two gambles are presented without the additional factor. 
1.1.2 From Prospect Theory to Neuroeconomics 
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky presented empirical evidence that 
led to the discredit of EU theory and the establishment of prospect theory (PT; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Using choice problems and thus data from behav-
ioral economics, they showed that humans violate the axioms described in EU the-
ory and show irrational (i.e. not utility maximizing) decision making behavior. As 
one of these choice problems, the Allais paradox was used to counter the independ-
ency axiom (Allais, 1953). In the Allais paradox, individuals are asked to make 
choices between two gambles in two separate experiments (Table 1). In these ex-
periments, it was found that individuals tend to choose gambles A and D, which is 
in stark contrast with the independency axiom of EU theory. This becomes clear 
when the paradox is depicted in a different manner (Table 2), which specifically 
shows that in each experiment a third factor (1000€ in experiment 1 and 0€ in ex-
periment 2, depicted in bold, italicized letters in Table 2) is added to each gamble.  
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Table 1. First depiction of the Allais paradox. 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D 
Amount Chance Amount Chance Amount Chance Amount Chance 
1000€ 100% 1000€ 89% 0€ 89% 0€ 90% 
0€ 1% 1000€ 11% 
5000€ 10% 5000€ 10% 
 
According to EU theory, the individual should choose either A and C or B and D, 
since they can be seen as the same choice. However, empirical data showed that 
human decision makers consistently violate the independency axiom of EU theory, 
thus showing irrational human behavior. 
 
Table 2. Second depiction of the Allais paradox. The third factors are depicted in bold, 
italicized letters and the gamble amounts and chances are colored to emphasize their simi-
larities. 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D 
Amount Chance Amount Chance Amount Chance Amount Chance 
1000€ 89% 1000€ 89% 0€ 89% 0€ 89% 
1000€ 11% 0€ 1% 1000€ 11% 0€ 1% 
5000€ 10% 5000€ 10% 
 
As one of the main pillars, PT replaced the utility function with a value function. 
This value function showed that individuals have a reference point relative to gains 
and losses and that individuals exhibit loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). This becomes particularly clear when the steep convex shape in the loss do-
main is compared to the more gradual concave shape in the gain domain (Figure 
3A). It emphasizes that “losses loom larger than gains”, because a loss is related to 
a more negative value when compared to its relative gain and the associated positive 
value. Besides the value function, Kahneman and Tversky used PT to additionally 
provide evidence that individuals overweight low probabilities and underweight 
large probabilities, thus resulting in an inverse-S shaped weighting function (Figure 
3B).  
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Figure 3. Functions of prospect theory (adapted from Glimcher and Fehr, 2014).  
A. Value function, showing a steeper and convex shape for losses. B. Weighting function 
(inverse “S” shape), depicting an individual’s tendency to overweight low and underweight 
high probabilities.  
 
Therefore, by incorporating the idea of subjective weighting during the decision 
process, PT provided researchers with a more accurate model of human decision 
making (Civai and Hawes, 2016). Ever since, several phenomena in psychology, 
such as the endowment effect (people value things more if they own them) or the 
framing effect (behavioral differences when the same question is asked in terms of 
losses or gains), have been explained using PT. With respect to individual stock 
market behavior, the disposition effect (holding losing stocks too long while selling 
winners too early) and the equity premium (irrational risk and loss aversion leading 
to a high premium demand for buying stocks instead of bonds), have both been 
shown to be consistent with PT and not EU theory (Camerer, 2004). Additionally, 
research using real-life financial data has shown that PT can explain systematic 
trading biases and loss aversion of individual investors (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; 
Barberis, 2013; Barberis et al., 2016).  
The idea of humans as irrational decision makers was so revolutionary that it 
brought the fields of economics and psychology closer together and, collectively 
with the invention of fMRI in the beginning of the 1990’s (Ogawa et al., 1990; 
Blamire et al., 1992; Frahm et al., 1992; Kwong et al., 1992), led to the formation 
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of neuroeconomics. Nowadays, almost all research that includes economics, psy-
chology, and neuroscience to study the processes of human decision making can be 
considered neuroeconomic research.  
1.2 The Neuroscience of Reward, Loss, and Risk Processing 
1.2.1 Processing of Rewards, Losses, and Subjective Value 
Based on a great wealth of neuropsychological decision making research, several 
frameworks have recently been suggested to explain voluntary economic decision 
making (O’Doherty, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Schultz, 2015). These frame-
works agree on four major steps (listed here chronologically): choice perception 
(sensory detection), choice comparison and decision (including valuation, value 
comparison, and action choice), decision implementation (action), and a final learn-
ing step. 
In this context, reward-based learning mechanisms have been identified as a crucial 
component for the survival of a species (Schultz, 2015). Without rewards, no or-
ganism would survive, since the inherent beneficial properties of a reward (such as 
obtaining a nutrient-rich fruit or successful sexual reproduction) are essential for 
survival. In a meta-analysis involving 206 fMRI studies, two regions (among others 
not mentioned for sake of simplicity) were identified as playing a major role in 
reward processing (Bartra et al., 2013); namely, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC, Figure 4A) and the ventral striatum (VS, also termed nucleus accumbens, 
Figure 4B). In line with these findings, neurochemical studies have shown that the 
neurotransmitter dopamine, produced in neuronal cell bodies of the ventral tegmen-
tal area (VTA) and the substantia nigra (SN, also seen in Figure 4B), is released in 
the vmPFC and the VS (excellent overviews can be found in Haber and Knutson, 
2010 and in Schultz, 2015). Here, the reward prediction error (RPE) has been es-
tablished as an explanation of learning processes (Glimcher, 2011; Schultz, 2016, 
2017). The RPE is implemented via dopamine and makes it possible for humans to 
learn from correct and incorrect choices by comparing the outcome of a decision to 
its previous reward prediction (further explanations and a detailed implementation 
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can be found in section 2.1.4). A long line of research has identified the VS as the 
main center for RPE computations (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz and Dickinson, 
2000; Hare et al., 2008; Fliessbach et al., 2010; Rohe et al., 2012; Schultz, 2015, 
2016, 2017). 
 
Figure 4. Visualization of the two most important brain regions related to reward and value 
processing (underlined in red). A. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), here  
labeled as the “Medial Prefrontal Cortex”. B. The ventral striatum (VS), here labeled as the 
“Nucleus Accumbens”. Both images were adapted from 3D Brain. 
 
Besides rewards, loss avoidance plays an important role in decision making. Since 
a loss entails a negative impact on the organism’s state, its natural goal must be to 
avoid it. Both the vmPFC and the VS have been shown to be involved in loss pro-
cessing (Seymour et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Cooper and Knutson, 2008), but 
the brain region that has primarily been linked (again, amongst others that are not 
mentioned here for sake of simplicity) to both the processing and avoidance of 
losses has been the anterior insula (AI, Figure 5; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008; 
Fukunaga et al., 2012).  
In the light of evolution, the human decision making process is thus based on pur-
suing rewards and avoiding losses. Amongst other factors (e.g. motivation, delay, 
and risk, last of which is discussed in the next section; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011), these 
two aspects are weighted against each other to assign a value to each option. Im-
portantly, in the valuation and outcome phase of a decision, all three regions (i.e. 
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the AI, VS, and especially the vmPFC) have been shown to be active (Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014). 
 
Figure 5. Neuroanatomy of the anterior insula (AI),  A. Illustration of the insula cortex 
(adapted from Singer et al., 2009). B. Photograph of a human left insular cortex, with both 
ac (anterior long insular gyrus) and as (anterior short insular gyrus) being part of the  
anterior insula (adapted from Craig, 2009). 
 
1.2.2 Risk Processing 
In decisions under risk, the probability distributions of the possible outcomes are 
known. Notably, all three previously mentioned regions (i.e. the AI, VS, and the 
vmPFC) have been shown to play important roles in risky decision making (Figure 
6). Especially the risk seeking signals in the VS and risk aversion signals in the AI 
have been the focus of a great line of previous laboratory-based studies (Kuhnen 
and Knutson, 2005; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Bossaerts, 
2010; Rudorf et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014; Knutson and Huettel, 2015; Leong et 
al., 2016). In a recent seminal study investigating brain activation in market bubbles, 
VS activation (in the region of interest shown in Figure 6B) was linked to a higher 
propensity to buy risky assets, while AI activation (in the region of interest shown 
in Figure 6C) was associated with selling such assets in time before the market 
crashed (Smith et al., 2014). Henceforth, the AI activation acted as a warning signal 
and individuals with more AI activation and less VS activation earned more money 
in the experiment (Smith et al., 2014).  
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Figure 6. Three brain regions of interest from the literature that are known to be involved 
in risky decision making. A. The modality-independent subjective value signal in the  
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; adapted from Bartra et al., 2013). B. The 6 mm-
radius sphere centered on the ventral striatum (VS; adapted from Smith et al., 2014).  
C. The 6 mm-radius sphere centered on the right anterior insula (AI; adapted from Smith 
et al., 2014, who created it by taking the peak coordinates from the peak “risk prediction” 
signal from Preuschoff et al., 2008). 
 
1.3 Benefits of the Neuroeconomic Approach 
Since its inception in the 1990s, the field of neuroeconomics has significantly ad-
vanced. The inclusion of neuroscientific techniques made it possible for economists 
to understand the neural processes of certain economic decisions. Neural processes 
from prospect theory, such as loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007) and framing effects 
(Gonzalez et al., 2005), were mostly investigated in the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. On top of the basic and exploratory research, each neuroeconomic subfield 
(e.g. risky choices or intertemporal discounting) now integrates additional scientific 
tools (e.g. personality tests) and includes studies with more applied questions. In 
this process, more accurate and comprehensive models of human decision making 
have been developed, and some analyses that include brain activation have even 
gone so far as to predict real-life outcomes, such as the cultural success of music 
(Berns and Moore, 2012) or the success of public health campaigns (Falk et al., 
2015c). Both basic and applied neuroeconomic research is important for the field, 
as one can drive the other and strengthens the collaboration between science and 
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funding agencies (especially from the industry). This thesis contains aspects from 
both basic and applied research. Study one describes the basic research of a com-
mon neural currency in context with two applied topics: soccer and money. Study 
two is a basic research study that analyses the correlation between attention distri-
bution in risky gambles and reward- and loss-related brain activation. Study three 
is the most applied study and presents the first neuroeconomic model of real-life 
stock trading.  
Avenues of both basic and applied research are necessary to improve and build 
newer and better models of human behavior, which in turn reveal previously hidden 
gaps of knowledge. This precept guided the studies included in this thesis. In par-
ticular, study three demonstrates that a combined neuroeconomic (neuroscience, 
psychology, and economics) approach is better at filling one of many knowledge 
gaps found in relation to real-life household financial behavior (Frydman and 
Camerer, 2016), namely real-life financial risk taking. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
This chapter describes the materials and methods that I used throughout my doctoral 
studies. It gives an overview of how brain activation can be measured using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and how risk-, reward-, and loss-related 
brain activation can be analyzed. This is then followed by a description of further 
neuroeconomic techniques, including risk assessments (behavioral and self-assess-
ments), eye-tracking, personality measurements, as well as the assessment of house-
hold and cognitive characteristics. 
2.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
2.1.1 From Atomic Flips to Whole-brain Analysis 
First published in the early 1990s, fMRI is a neuroimaging technique that provides 
researchers with the ability to create brain activation images based on the metabolic 
changes found in relation to brain activity (Ogawa et al., 1990; Blamire et al., 1992; 
Frahm et al., 1992; Kwong et al., 1992). In fMRI, a very strong and static magnetic 
field (quantified in Tesla (T)) is used to align atoms along the axis of the magnetic 
field (Huettel et al., 2014). A specialized electrical coil then uses radio waves to 
deliver pulses of energy to these atoms, which causes them to jump from a low- to 
a high-energy state and back, thus resulting in a measurable energy release (the 
magnetic resonance signal (MR signal; Huettel et al., 2014)). Red blood cells con-
tain the molecule hemoglobin (Hb), for which the degree of oxygenation varies. 
Oxygenated Hb is diamagnetic, whereas deoxygenated Hb is paramagnetic. The 
MR signal reflects this ratio.  
In this context, it is important to understand the blood-oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD, or hemodynamic) response (Figure 7), seen as the physiological response 
to neuronal activation (Siero et al., 2013). 
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Figure 7. A typical blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response, divided up into three 
phases (adapted from Siero et al., 2013). 
 
In a typical BOLD response, a firing of neurons in a certain brain area leads to local 
oxygen extraction and increase of deoxygenated blood concentration, represented 
as the “initial dip” (Siero et al., 2013, Figure 7). This is then followed by the main 
BOLD response, which is a major boost in cerebral blood flow and results in an 
oversupply of oxygenated blood to the area associated with the neuronal activity 
(Siero et al., 2013, Figure 7). The change in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated 
blood is used to create parametric maps of the brain, thus indicating brain activation 
associated with a specific task. Since the brain is reconstructed using three-dimen-
sional 3 x 3 x 3 mm cubic spatial units called “voxels”, the BOLD time course of 
each voxel can be investigated (Markett, 2016). However, before any investigations 
can take place, artifacts are removed in a series of computational procedures, called 
preprocessing. These usually include slice time correction, motion correction, spa-
tial normalization, reslicing, and a final smoothing step. After preprocessing, a gen-
eral linear model (GLM) is used to predict the BOLD time course variation of each 
voxel using a combination of several regressors (Penny et al., 2011). A basic GLM 
formula is as follows: 
 
Equation 1: 
y = x * ß + n 
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Here, y stands for the dependent variable (in our case the observed BOLD signal), 
x for the regressor, ß for the weight attached to the regressor (ß-value), and n for 
the intercept, which is a constant value added to the equation (Penny et al., 2011). 
The regressors are defined by the researcher and according to the experimental par-
adigm used in the fMRI task.  
 
Figure 8. Two types of fMRI paradigm designs. A. Example of a block-related design, 
showing the stimuli of conditions A (light blue) and B (light orange) as part of three  
predefined alternating blocks each. B. Event-related design, randomly showing stimuli 
from condition A (light blue) and condition B (light orange). 
 
The design of an fMRI paradigm that is shown to the participant can be either block- 
or event-related1. In a block-related design, two or more different conditions are 
variantly shown to the participant in a pre-defined sequence (Figure 8A). This is 
done to study the brain activation differences between the conditions. However, due 
to the limitations of block-related designs (e.g. habituation effects), researchers de-
veloped the event-related design (Figure 8B; Josephs et al., 1997). In event-related 
fMRI tasks, the presentation of certain stimuli is not collectively shown as part of a 
                                               
1 Or a mixture of the two (mixed design). Its description is omitted here for the sake 
of simplicity. 
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block. Instead, the presentation of trials belonging to a certain condition (e.g. con-
dition A vs. B in Figure 8B) is randomized. Even though an event-related design 
needs more trials per condition than a block-related design, it is better at estimating 
the shape of the hemodynamic response function and allowing the estimation of 
brain activation in response to single events (D’Esposito et al., 1999). The invention 
of event-related designs led to a whole new genre of fMRI experiments, because 
researchers could from thereon use fMRI to study the brain activation patterns as-
sociated with more complex tasks (Josephs et al., 1997; D’Esposito et al., 1999). In 
the studies presented as part of my dissertation, we exclusively used event-related 
fMRI designs. 
An example of a regressor (x in Equation 1) that my colleagues and I defined in one 
of our event-related fMRI tasks is the choice of stock or bond in the gain domain in 
the stock learning task of study three (for all regressors of each fMRI study please 
see pages 6 and 7 in study one, Table 1 in study two, and Supplementary Tables S1 
and S2 in study three). Depending on the research question, a duration (e.g. the 
reaction time until stock or bond selection in study three) and parametric modula-
tors (e.g. the reward prediction in Table 2 of study two, further explained in chapter 
3.14) can be defined for each regressor, as well. Once the regressors (x) are defined 
and used to estimate the ß-values (ß), t-tests can be calculated to look for differences 
between two experimental conditions (e.g. stock > bond choice, study three) or be-
tween a regressor and baseline activation (e.g. parametrically modulated reward 
prediction error > 0, all three studies). To look at such differences, contrasts are 
established (e.g. ß1 > ß2) at the individual subject level (first-level, also later used 
in the weighted ß-value extraction). The specific contrasts of all participants can 
then be combined at a group-level to make statistical inferences across participants. 
This is usually referred to as the second-level analysis. However, since one fMRI 
volume consists of more than 10,000 voxels, the whole-brain activation cannot 
simply be looked at without a statistical threshold and should be corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons. In our studies, we attempted to minimize the alpha (false-posi-
tive) error by using a conservative family wise error (FWE) rate correction using 
the Bonferroni procedure. Additionally, we used a cluster correction of larger than 
ten voxels (k > 10) to eliminate isolated voxels that exceeded the FWE-threshold. 
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2.1.2 Further Brain Analysis 
On top of the now-standard whole-brain analysis, we used three additional tech-
niques in our studies: covariate and region of interests2 analysis, as well as weighted 
ß-value extraction. In covariate analysis, a variable (e.g. a personality trait score 
such as egoism in study one) is included as a covariate in a certain contrast (e.g. 
scoring a goal after a shot > scoring after a pass, study one) to test for the association 
between the variable and the estimated brain activation. In region of interest analy-
sis, masks can be taken from established previous studies to test for locally specific 
brain activation. Alternatively, researchers can create their own regions of interest 
using their own contrasts (considered the least acknowledged option since the re-
gions of interest are created from and analyzed with the same data set) or by creating 
spheres around coordinates taken from the literature or a reverse-inference database 
(e.g. Neurosynth). For each participant, mean weighted ß-values can then be ex-
tracted for each mask. Importantly, these values can be used for further statistical 
procedures, such as correlation analysis with eye-tracking fixations (study two) or 
as independent variables in regression analysis of real-life financial risk taking out-
comes (study three). 
2.1.3 Measuring Financial Risk-related Brain Activation 
Financial risk-related brain activation can be measured in several different ways 
(Häusler and Weber, 2017). While paradigms such as the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002) and the certainty equivalent (CE) task 
(Christopoulos et al., 2009) represent more abstract paradigms, we used an estab-
lished (Kuhnen, 2015) and more applied stock learning paradigm that specifically 
asked participants to decide between a stock (risky) and a bond (riskless). More 
specifically, participants were asked to make 96 choices between a stock (risky) and 
a bond (riskless) option in a gain or a loss context (Figure 1 in study three) and we 
used this task to compare brain activation during a risk seeking versus a risk aver-
sive choice (stock > bond). Additionally, we extracted ß-values from these choice 
                                               
2 Please note that the usual abbreviation for region of interest (i.e. ROI) is not used through-
out this thesis, because of possible confusion with the Risk Optimism Index (ROI, see 
chapter 2.2.1 for details) 
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contrasts using regions of interest taken from the neuroeconomic literature (study 
three) and subsequently associated them with real-life financial risk taking. 
2.1.4 Measuring the Components of Reward and Loss Processing 
In 1997, researchers used single dopamine neuron recordings in monkeys to find 
the neural basis of reward processing (Schultz et al., 1997). Since then, many stud-
ies have investigated reward processing (for an excellent review see Schultz, 2016) 
and have identified its main components, namely reward prediction (RP), reward 
reception (RR), and reward prediction error (RPE). The RP represents the probabil-
ity of obtaining a reward (e.g. 33.33% for selecting the correct symbol out of three 
(Figure 2B in study one)). Since the RR can either be a win (represented as a “1”) 
or no win (represented as a “0”), the RPE can be calculated as the difference be-
tween the RR and the RP (RPE = RR – RP). In this context, paradigms with finan-
cial incentives can be very useful, because the specific values of the above-named 
components can be introduced as parametric modulators in the first-level analysis. 
Our research group has therefore developed several such paradigms to investigate 
the neural activations of each reward processing component (Fliessbach et al., 2010; 
Rohe et al., 2012).  
We chose one of the previously established paradigms to be part of our research 
(studies one and two). In this monetary guessing paradigm, the participant is asked 
to make a choice between either one, two, three, or four symbols. A correct choice 
results in a win of 10€ cents, while a wrong choice results in no monetary gain. In 
study one, we used the exact same version of the paradigm as in a previous study 
(Rohe et al., 2012). This paradigm contained 150 trials, since in fMRI research mul-
tiple trials of the same manipulation are necessary to improve the functional signal-
to-noise ratio (signal averaging; Huettel et al., 2014). Before the second study, we 
performed a small (n = 20) fMRI pre-testing study in which we used modified ver-
sions (with fewer trials) of the monetary guessing paradigm to identify the number 
of trials necessary to elicit robust reward-related brain activation. As a result, we 
were able to decrease the trial number down to 48 (while keeping an appropriate 
signal-to-noise ratio and reliable reward processing activation), thus making the 
paradigm less time-consuming. Importantly, this modification made it possible to 
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additionally include a loss and a neutral domain. In the loss domain, we introduced 
the processing components of loss prediction (LP: the probability of obtaining a 
loss), loss reception (LR: either no loss (represented as 0) or loss (represented as -
1)), and loss prediction error (LPE = LR – LP). By using each of these components 
as parametric modulators during either the choice or the feedback phase of the par-
adigm (see Table 2 in study two for an overview), we were able to study both reward 
and loss activation using a single paradigm. 
In addition to investigating monetary reward and loss processing, we applied the 
reward processing logic to a social context, namely two-versus-one situations in 
front of a soccer goal (soccer paradigm, Figure 1 and 2 in study one). By pre-testing 
these situations via the online survey tool, we were able to obtain the average like-
lihood of scoring a goal (with 38.6 ±3.44 ratings per situation). We then imple-
mented this probability as the RP modulation. Since the result was either scoring a 
goal (represented as 1) or not (represented as 0), the RPE could be calculated. These 
three parametric modulators where then included in the first-level analysis and 
made it possible to compare money- and soccer-related reward activation (study 
one). 
In study three, we used the stock payoff feedback phase of the stock learning task 
to compare good with bad outcomes (i.e. high stock payoff feedback after stock 
choice > low stock payoff feedback after stock choice) and to study reward and loss 
reception in a risk-related context (Supplementary Tables S3 and S4 in study three, 
see chapter 2.2.2 for further details). 
2.2 Risk Taking and Further Risk-related Assessments 
2.2.1 Self-assessments of Financial Risk Taking 
In study three, several self-assessment scales from financial institutions and from 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP; Wagner et al., 2007) were used to meas-
ure self-ratings pertaining to either risk tolerance or risk optimism (please see Sup-
plementary Table S5 in study three for a full overview). Additionally, risk taking in 
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a hypothetical lottery question was assessed by asking how much of 100,000€ (pre-
viously won in a lottery) a participant would re-invest into a 50:50 chance of an-
other lottery. Here, the amount invested was taken as another measure of financial 
risk taking. Importantly, all the behavioral (except for the stock estimation error) 
and self-assessments were grouped into either the risk tolerance or risk optimism 
category. Each category then underwent a principal component analysis (PCA), 
which resulted in two indices representing risk optimism (ROI) and risk tolerance 
(RTI). Notably, the creation of more general risk factors using both behavioral and 
self-assessment measures has recently been shown to be appropriate, since behav-
ioral and propensity measures assess specific risk components and correlate only 
weakly (Mamerow et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2017). 
2.2.2 Behavioral Measurements 
In the stock learning task of study three (Figure 1 in study three), participants were 
asked in 96 trials to decide between a risky (stock) and a riskless (bond) choice. 
The 96 trials were split up into 16 blocks containing either a good or a bad stock. A 
good stock was programmed to present a good outcome in 70% of the trials, while 
a bad stock was programmed to present a good outcome in only 30% of the trials. 
Over the course of a block (containing six trials each), subjects used the stock pay-
off feedback to learn about a stock being either good or bad. To exclude a learning-
effect on the risk-related choice, we calculated the ratio of risky (stock) to riskless 
(bond) choices, but only using the choice of the first trial out of every block. Besides 
this behavioral measure of financial risk taking, we used the stock estimation after 
each stock payoff feedback to obtain two measurements relating to risk learning. 
As one of these, the stock assessment error was taken as the absolute difference 
between the objective and subjective probability of the stock being good, while be-
havioral risk optimism was measured as the same, but non-absolute difference. 
Another behavioral paradigm assessing financial risk taking was the stock alloca-
tion task, used in study three (Supplementary Figure S4 in study three). Here, par-
ticipants were asked to make ten independent decisions, in which they had to split 
up 23€ into either a risky (stock) or riskless (bond) asset. The average amount of 
money allocated to the stock was taken as a measurement of financial risk taking.  
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2.2.3 Eye-tracking 
In eye-tracking research, a participant’s eye is illuminated with an infrared light 
source (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Together with a corneal reflection, the pupil posi-
tion is tracked and the point of regard is thus calculated (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
Being the most popular eye-tracking method since the early 1990s, the pupil-cor-
neal reflection system is used to track the eye while compensating for small head 
movements (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Several types of eye movement events (sac-
cades, smooth pursuits, microsaccades etc.) can be measured this way. We were 
specifically interested in fixation numbers (i.e. gaze stability > 50 ms in prespeci-
fied areas of interest (AOI); study two), since these were previously used in finan-
cial risk-related research (Brandstätter and Körner, 2014) and are known to repre-
sent attention.  
To measure attention patterns in a gambling task (Figure 2 in study two), two col-
leagues and I designed and set-up a laboratory with an eye-tracking and behavioral 
testing area (Figure 9). On the participant table (Table #1 in Figure 9) of the eye-
tracking area, a chinrest, a display, and a keyboard were used to fixate the partici-
pant’s head, show the paradigm, and let the participant make decisions. Together 
with an adjacent infrared light illuminator, an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research) eye-
tracker was positioned below the display. 
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Figure 9. Setup scheme of the laboratory, which included an eye-tracking area (light  
orange) and a behavioral area (light blue). 
 
Using the pupil and corneal reflection of the infrared illumination to reconstruct a 
point of regard, we measured the number of fixations in predefined AOIs (Figure 
2C in study two). We used these to calculate attentional differences between mon-
etary values (f(v)) and their respective probabilities (f(p)) in risky gambles in the 
win (Df win = f(v) – f(p)) and in the loss (Df loss = f(v) – f(p)) domain (Figure 2 
and Table 7 in study two). These attentional differences (Df win and Df loss) were 
then associated with the reward and loss-related brain activation measured in a sep-
arate paradigm (Figure 1 in study two). Since a choice between a high- and a low-
risk gamble (A and B, Figure 1B in study two) had to be made additionally, we used 
the percentage of high-risk choices in each domain as a behavioral measurement of 
financial risk taking. 
2.3 Personality 
During my PhD, I used four questionnaires to assess personality traits: the NEO 
Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, study three), the HEXACO Personality Inventory 
- Revised (HEXACO-PI-R, study one), the social value orientation (SVO, study 
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one) questionnaire, and Reuter and Montag’s revised Reinforcement Sensitivity 
Theory Questionnaire (rRST-Q, study three). In study one, we used to the 
HEXACO-PI-R and the SVO questionnaire due to their relevance to our research 
question concerning egoism, while the widely employed NEO-FFI and rRST-Q 
were used in study three to study the correlates of financial risk taking. 
The NEO-FFI is a 60-item inventory that is based on the Five-Factor Model (FFM) 
of personality and was developed to measure the personality traits of “Neuroticism” 
(NEO-N), “Agreeableness” (NEO-A), “Extraversion” (NEO-E), “Conscientious-
ness” (NEO-C), and “Openness to Experience” (NEO-O, (Costa and McCrae, 
1992). A decade later, the HEXACO model was developed to measure six person-
ality scales: “Honesty-Humility”, “Emotionality”, “eXtraversion”, “Agreeable-
ness”, “Conscientiousness”, and “Openness to Experience” (Lee and Ashton, 2004, 
2006). Even though the HEXACO model is based on the Five-Factor model, it im-
portantly contains the additional HH scale, which has been shown to lie beyond the 
Big Five and measure egoism (Ashton and Lee, 2005; de Vries et al., 2009; Hilbig 
and Zettler, 2009; Lee and Ashton, 2012; Ashton, 2013). In study one, we thus used 
the HH score to study the association between brain activation in soccer situations 
and egoism. We furthermore used the SVO questionnaire, which uses financial de-
cisions in a social context to distinguish between prosocial and proself choices (van 
Lange et al., 1997).  
While the FFM was developed using a lexical approach (Cattell, 1947; Tupes and 
Christal, 1992; Ashton, 2013), the first RST was developed on the basis of brain 
structures (Gray, 1981, 1987; Ashton, 2013). It was initially designed to measure 
the mesolimbic behavioral activation system (BAS: formerly the “go” system), 
septo-hippocampal behavioral inhibition system (BIS: formerly the “stop” system), 
and the Fight-or-Flight system. Later, it was first revised by the original authors 
(Gray and McNaughton, 2000) and then also recently (Reuter et al., 2015) to in-
clude revised versions of the BAS and BIS, as well as a new Fight Flight Freeze 
System (FFFS). We used the most recent version (i.e. the rRST-Q in study three) to 
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assess approach and goal-directed behavior (BAS), responses to situations of un-
certainty (or wary behavior, BIS), as well as defensive responses (low fight, high 
flight and high freezing behavior, FFFS) in relation to financial risk taking. 
2.4 Sociodemographic Characteristics 
We used several scales and questions from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) study (Wagner et al., 2007) and the Munich Center for the Economics of 
Aging (MEA) to assess household characteristics (Table 1 in study three) pertaining 
to the personal (e.g. age and years of education) and family situation (e.g. marital 
status and number of people in household). Questions regarding financial matters 
(e.g. income and having financial liabilities) and financial knowledge (financial lit-
eracy, numeracy, and debt literacy) were assessed (Christelis et al., 2006; Lusardi 
and Tufano, 2009; Mitchell and Lusardi, 2011), as well. Importantly, the dependent 
variable of study three (“Do you trade stocks yourself?”) was specifically created 
to study financial risk taking in a real-life context.  
Since the measurement time of each participant in the experiment of study three 
was already approximately three to four hours, we decided to include only three 
sub-scales of the Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 Revised (IST 2000R). These cog-
nitive measures assessed verbal, numerical, and figural intelligence (Liepmann et 
al., 2007). 
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3. Summary of Research Findings 
3.1 Study One: Comparing Reward Processing upon Winning 
Money and Scoring a Soccer Goal 
Häusler AN, Becker B, Bartling M, Weber B (2015) Goal or gold: overlapping 
reward processes in soccer players upon scoring and winning money. PLOS 
ONE e0122798:1–16. 
The idea of a “common neural currency” was first introduced in 2002 and defined 
as a necessity in reward-guided behavior “to value diverse behavioral acts and sen-
sory stimuli” (Montague and Berns, 2002). To enable a comparison between diverse 
goods (e.g. 2€ (money) and 100g of blueberries (food)), neuroeconomists deemed 
it crucial for the brain to transform the values of goods into one neural currency. 
Ever since, many studies have shown similarities in neural processing of dissimilar 
goods (Chib et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2010; Bartra et al., 2013; McNamee et al., 
2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014). In relation to social rewards and in line with 
social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), only two studies had previously investi-
gated common reward processing upon positive monetary and social outcomes. 
Izuma et al. (2008) studied brain activation in response to monetary gains and good 
reputation, while Lin et al. (2012) examined brain activation in relation to monetary 
gains and positive social feedback. However, no study had examined, whether a 
common reward-related brain activation would also be found in situations of posi-
tive social reward in the context of sports. For this purpose, we used arguably one 
of the most common reward-related sport situations, i.e. scoring a goal in the 
world’s most popular team sport: soccer (in 2006, 270 million people were active 
in soccer (FIFA, 2007)). 
We invited 33 soccer players (24.4 ±3.2 years, all male) to the study and used the 
three components of reward prediction error (RPE) processing (reward prediction 
(RP), reward reception (RR), and RPE, see chapter 2.1.4 for details) to compare 
brain activation upon winning (or not winning) money and scoring (or not scoring) 
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a soccer goal (Figure 2 in study one). We found that reward-related structures (spe-
cifically the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (VS)) 
were activated during RR and RPE processing of both reward types (Table 1 and 
Figure 3 in study one). These major findings supplied a possible reward-guided 
explanation for the popularity of playing soccer and team sports in general. They 
provided further evidence for a common neural currency, which has recently been 
additionally extended using another neuroscientific method, namely electroenceph-
alography (EEG) (Distefano et al., 2018). 
We additionally studied egoism, because it is seen as a motive for allegedly selfish 
behavior in sport situations. We used the ratio of shooting versus passing in a newly 
invented soccer paradigm (Figure 2A in study one) and two personality scales (the 
Honesty-Humility (HH) scale of the HEXACO-PI-R, as well as the social value 
orientation questionnaire (SVO); see chapter 2.3 for details) as indices of egoism. 
We hypothesized that more egoistic individuals would have higher reward-related 
activation upon scoring after having decided to shoot the ball versus scoring after 
having decided to pass it to a teammate. This would then indicate a reward-guided 
motivation for seemingly egoistic behavior on the soccer pitch. We did not find 
evidence supporting this theory, but discovered that activation in the left middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG) upon scoring after a pass versus a shot is positively correlated 
with egoism (Figure 4 in study one). We were therefore able to draw two additional 
minor conclusions. In soccer, more egoistic individuals do not act egoistically due 
to a reward-related motive. Furthermore, they require more self-reflective spatial 
and reasoning neural effort upon observing success after a selfless act (Belger et al., 
1998; Goel et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 1998; Prohovnik et al., 2004; Addis et al., 
2007).  
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3.2 Study Two: Correlating Reward- and Loss-related Brain 
Activation to Attention in Risky Gambles 
Häusler AN, Artigas SO, Trautner P, Weber B (2016) Gain- and loss-related brain 
activation are associated with information search differences in risky gambles: 
An fMRI and eye-tracking study. eNeuro 3:1–13. 
After having completed study one and while collecting the data for study three, I 
reviewed the literature to find out whether individuals – when confronted with a 
lottery – pay more attention to the probability of winning or to the associated mon-
etary amount. Additionally, I was interested in whether such differences had previ-
ously been associated with brain regions responsible for reward, loss, and risk pro-
cessing. I found that studies had demonstrated individual differences in attention 
(Fiedler and Glöckner, 2012; Brandstätter and Körner, 2014) and risk-related brain 
activation (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008; Rudorf et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014). 
Additionally, in the context of human decisions involving rewards, losses, and risks, 
an “affect-integration-motivation” (AIM) framework had been suggested, thus 
providing a framework for the study of brain activation and attention (Samanez-
Larkin and Knutson, 2015). Along with the AIM framework, many previous studies 
involving reward, loss, and risk processing (Schultz et al., 1997; Knutson et al., 
2000; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Tom et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 2007; Cooper 
and Knutson, 2008; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008; Fliessbach et al., 2010; Fukunaga 
et al., 2012; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014) led to our hypothesis 
that gain- and loss-related brain activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), the ventral striatum (VS), and the anterior insula (AI) would be associ-
ated with attention (measured via number of fixations; see chapter 2.2.3 for details) 
to probabilities or their respective monetary outcomes in an eye-tracking task in-
volving risky gambles.  
We used a similar fMRI paradigm to the monetary paradigm in study one, but ad-
ditionally included a loss domain (Figure 1 in study two; see chapter 2.1.4 for de-
tails). Even though eye-tracking had been used in relation to event-related fMRI 
paradigms and inside the fMRI scanning environment before (Ettinger et al., 2008; 
Lim et al., 2011; Meyhöfer et al., 2015; Kasparbauer et al., 2016), we collected the 
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eye-tracking data outside of the fMRI environment. For this purpose, we created an 
eye-tracking task with risky gambles (Figure 2 in study two) based on a previously 
established binary lottery choice task (Fiedler and Glöckner, 2012; Glöckner et al., 
2012; Fiedler et al., 2013). 
We invited 50 healthy adult males (25.9 ±4.6 years, all male) to participate in both 
experiments and found that individual differences in vmPFC activation during RPE 
processing were associated with paying more attention to the monetary outcomes 
compared to the respective probabilities in the gain domain (Figure 4A and B in 
study two). Additionally, individual differences in the VS and the posterior cingu-
late cortex (PCC) during loss prediction error (LPE) processing (see chapter 2.1.4 
for details) were associated with paying more attention to the probabilities of risky 
gambles in the loss domain (Figure 4C and D in study two). This study therefore 
provided evidence that individual differences in monetary reward and loss pro-
cessing are associated with individual differences in risk-related attention to either 
probabilities or their respective outcomes. Additionally, this study was the first to 
show a correlation between fMRI brain activation and eye-tracking data, as meas-
ured via two independent experiments using either method. Our RPE and LPE find-
ings have recently been strengthened by the inclusion in an fMRI meta-analysis on 
prediction error valence and surprise (Fouragnan et al., 2018), in which similar 
brain regions were found to be responsible for each processing type (e.g. vmPFC in 
reward domain and insula in the loss domain). Furthermore, a recent study on the 
brain activation mechanisms of risky vs. secure e-payments (Casado-Aranda et al., 
2018) has extended our brain activation findings to a more applied context. Here, 
the researchers linked the brain activation, which was found in our study in relation 
to reward prediction (e.g. the middle frontal gyrus), to brain activation in response 
to secure e-payments (Casado-Aranda et al., 2018). 
3.3 Study Three: Neuroeconomic Correlates of Real-life 
Financial Risk Taking 
Häusler AN, Kuhnen C, Rudorf S, Weber B (2018) Preferences and beliefs about 
financial risk taking mediate the association between anterior insula activation 
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and self-reported real-life stock trading. Scientific Reports 8:1-13. 
In Germany, ownership of direct shares amongst private households amounts to an 
estimated 158 billion Euros (Deutsche Bundesbank (German National Bank), 
2016). However, in comparison to other countries, the German population is finan-
cially risk averse and invests fewer of its assets into stocks (von Lüde, 2013; 
Campbell, 2016; OECD, 2017). Since this behavior can be costly for households 
(Calvet et al., 2007) and the neuroscientific correlates of real-life financial risk tak-
ing are unknown, we invited 210 participants (39.0 ±6.7 years, all male) to partake 
in a 3.5h long neuroeconomic experiment. Participants underwent extensive neuro-
scientific, psychological, and economic measurements to find the correlates of in-
dividual differences in financial risk taking.  
We used the real-life financial risk taking question of active stock trading (“Do you 
trade stocks yourself?”) to group individuals into active stock traders and non-active 
stock traders. We then adapted a previously established stock paradigm (Kuhnen, 
2015) to a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) setting. By extracting 
brain activation during risky (stock) versus safe (bond) choice from regions of in-
terest (taken from three seminal neuroeconomic studies (Preuschoff et al., 2008; 
Bartra et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2014)), we examined whether the previously found 
association between financial risk taking and the ventral striatum, ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, and the anterior insula (AI; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Singer et al., 
2009; Mohr et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011; Rudorf et al., 2012; Bartra et al., 2013; De 
Martino et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Knutson and 
Huettel, 2015; Leong et al., 2016) would transfer to financial risk taking in real life.  
We found that individuals who trade stocks in real life show a lower risk aversion 
signal in the AI when choosing the stock versus the bond in the fMRI task. The 
study therefore advanced the neuroeconomic research agenda by discovering the 
brain activation correlates of real-life stock trading. Because evidence of the asso-
ciation between household variables and neuroscience had been scarce (Frydman 
and Camerer, 2016), the study was able to fill this important gap in the field of 
neuroeconomics (i.e. relating laboratory measures to real-life behavior). Addition-
ally, we showed that not economic variables (i.e. financial constraints, education, 
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the understanding of financial matters, and cognitive abilities), but two separate 
indices of risk tolerance and risk optimism explain the association between brain 
activation and real-life financial risk taking behavior. To formally test this, we used 
mediation analysis and found that the association between the risk aversion signal 
in the AI and real-life financial risk taking was mediated through both indices of 
risk tolerance and risk optimism. 
  
Neuroeconomic Foundations of Reward, Loss, and Risk Processing 
 
 46 
3.4 Linking the Three Studies 
The three studies presented in this thesis all used fMRI to provide new scientific 
evidence on the neuroeconomic foundations of reward, loss, and risk processing 
(Figure 10). Study one compared brain activation from a monetary and a social 
(sports) context, but only in the reward domain. Study two built on these findings 
by using a similar paradigm that additionally included a loss domain. This made it 
possible to further analyze loss-related brain activation. Finally, study three inves-
tigated the brain activation when participants were in both the reward and loss do-
main, and were asked to make risk-related decisions ((risky) stock vs. (safe) bond). 
The extracted reward-, loss-, and risk-related brain activation (VS, vmPFC, and AI) 
was then associated with financial risk taking behavior. 
 
 
Figure 10. Diagram depicting the relation between the three studies presented in this thesis. 
This overall scheme shows the use of neuroeconomic (neuroscientific, economic, and  
psychological) methods to investigate both basic and applied research questions. 
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All three studies show the benefit of the neuroeconomic approach to answer both 
basic and applied research questions about individual and group differences in hu-
man decision making (Figure 10). Studies one and two both unveiled individual 
differences in brain activation and found the respective associations with personal-
ity traits (egoism in study one) and behavioral outcomes (attention in study two). 
Study one investigated the basic research question of a common neural currency in 
monetary and social contexts. It additionally combined fMRI with personality ques-
tionnaires to answer a more applied research question that investigated egoism in 
sports. The analysis of the monetary-relevant brain activation in study one was then 
extended in study two. Here, the reward- and loss-related brain activation was 
placed into context with attention (eye-tracking) patterns to answer the basic re-
search question of whether these two measures are significantly correlated. Finally, 
study three investigated the applied research question of stock trading in real life. 
To fully show the benefit of the neuroeconomic approach, it included a comprehen-
sive methodology that combined fMRI with research methods from economics and 
psychology. This extensive approach unveiled the group differences between indi-
viduals who trade stocks in real life and those who do not. 
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4. Conclusion, Outlook, and Applications 
In this thesis, I presented three major findings. First, reward activation in social 
activities such as sports and reward activation elicited via financial wins share a 
common neural currency. Second, individual differences in attention distribution to 
either the values or the associated probabilities of risky gambles are related to indi-
vidual differences in monetary reward and loss processing. Third, differences in 
neural activation patterns of regions associated with risk aversion help to explain 
real-life financial risk taking. 
As an outlook for study one, decision making in other sports (e.g. basketball) and 
sport contexts (e.g. risky (dribble) vs. safe (pass) choices) could be investigated. 
This would clarify whether or not there is a general common neural currency across 
different sports and sport situations that could pose as an explanation for its world-
wide success. The brain activation in these decision making processes could addi-
tionally be compared to financial decision making (e.g. the stock exchange para-
digm from study three that also includes risky (stock) versus safe (bond) choices) 
to investigate whether the common neural currency can likewise be seen in relation 
to risk-, and not only reward-related decision making. From an application point of 
view, the egoism findings should find their way into the training books of soccer 
coaches to help them understand that individuals do not decide to shoot the ball 
themselves due to a reward-related motive, which is often seen as the driver for the 
seemingly greedy and egoistic behavior of shooting the ball yourself. 
Since the study design in study two prohibits any interpretation regarding causality, 
future studies could try to investigate the fundamental question of whether the iden-
tified brain activation differences observed during reward and loss processing lead 
to individual differences in attention distribution, or vice versa. Taking it one step 
further, it could be explored whether fMRI and eye-tracking measures can be used 
as early indicators of excessive financial risk taking and gambling addiction. Better 
understanding the causal dynamics of decision making processes behind lottery 
choices could lead to the development of appropriate measures and policies to pro-
tect potential gambling addicts from financial ruin. 
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As an outlook for study three, follow-up studies could include assessments of the 
financial choices of family and friends, genetic information, and structural brain 
data (e.g. diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), which we are currently investigating, see 
chapter 8.1.3). Such variables are likely to improve the model of active stock trad-
ing and lead to an even better understanding of this real-life human behavior. On a 
more global scale and considering recent evidence of risk taking dissimilarities be-
tween different parts of the world (Falk et al., 2015b, 2015a; Becker et al., 2016), 
the same study could be performed in other countries (e.g. USA) to unveil the neu-
roeconomic foundations of this internationally heterogeneous behavior (OECD, 
2017). Such an approach could uncover why German citizens are more financially 
risk averse than their US counterparts (Campbell, 2016; OECD, 2017). Additionally, 
the two risk indices developed in study three could be used to assess two important 
features that relate to financial risk taking. These measures of risk tolerance and 
risk optimism (RTI and ROI) could then help policy makers and financial institu-
tions. Policies could be established to protect individuals with low financial means 
(but very high RTI and ROI scores) from taking too many financial risks. Further-
more, individuals with a very low RTI score could be protected from a significant 
decrease in quality of life as a consequence of taking too many financial risks. From 
a financial institution point of view, individuals with a very low ROI score could be 
educated from a third party on the financial market and its associated products, thus 
possibly encouraging more financial risk taking. 
The findings from all three studies advance our understanding of reward, loss, and 
risk processing and bring us closer to comprehending the complex processes asso-
ciated with human decision making. Methods from neuroscience (neuroimaging), 
psychology (behavioral data, personality, and eye-tracking), and economics (lotter-
ies and household assessments) were used in all three studies and demonstrate the 
success of the interdisciplinary neuroeconomic approach. The prime example of 
this is study three, in which we compare separate and combined models to show 
that combining measurements from all three fields is essential for an apt analysis of 
real-life human decision making. Since human behavior is usually determined by 
many different variables, the goal of future neuroeconomists should be to identify 
these variables to create more comprehensive models of human behavior. With this 
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interdisciplinary approach, the independent findings of each field can be connected 
and complex human behavior can be better understood. Finally, these more com-
prehensive models of human behavior can be used to improve individual choices 
by creating policies that steer individuals away from irrational decisions. 
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